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NOTES
LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTION:
COMPUTER-ANIMATED EVIDENCE GETS
ITS DAY IN COURT
Red flashes, representing bullets, shoot across the screen and
through computer-generated images of victims) A male model run-
ning through a parking lot is struck by a bullet while turning around
with his arms in the air in surrender. 2
 Such images represent examples
of a new demonstrative aid that can be produced for trials with com-
puter animation and videotapes The development of this technology
permits attorneys to convert experts' ordinary, verbal testimony into
dynamic, visual demonstrations capable of mentally transporting jurors
to the scene of a crime to recreate an advocate's version of the events.'
Commentators believe that animations such as these will become in-
creasingly prevalent in all trial areas. 5
In 1985, lawyers for the United States made legal history by plac-
ing into substantive evidence a computer-animated videotape for the
I Rorie Sherman, Moving Graphics, NAT'L IA., Apr. 6, 1992, at 1, 31 [hereinafter Moving
Graphics].
2 1d.
3 Id. See also William M. Bulkeley, More Lawyers Use Animation To Sway Juries, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 18, 1982, at B1. Although the terms simulation and animation are often used interchange-
ably, the two concepts difkr in one important respect .. Robert B. Reagan, 1991 WL 330753 at *1.
Traditionally, animations consisted of an image perceived on a video or television screen that had
the characteristics of size, shape, color and motion. Id. Simulation, however, incorporates not
only visible characteristics but also mathematical characteristics such as mass, velocity and accel-
eration consistent with the laws of physics. Id. Throughout this Note, the term animated video,
or animation, will refer to all animations whether or not based upon computer simulations.
4 See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 31.
5 Id.
Substantive evidence is "[t]hat adduced for the purpose of proving a fact in issue, as
opposed to evidence given for the purpose of discrediting a witness . or of corroborating his
testimony." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1429 (6th ed. 1990). In comparison, demonstrative evi-
dence merely illustrates verbal testimony. People v. Diaz, 445 N.Y.S.2d 888, 889 (1981). Demon-
strative evidence is admissible only if the item sufficiently explains or illustrates relevant testimony
as to be of potential assistance to the trier or fact. Pilkington v. Hendricks County Rural Eke. Co.,
460 N.E.2d 1000, 1010 (lnd. Ct. App. 1984) (quoting McCottmicx, EVIDENCE § 212 (1972)).
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first time in a reported federal decision.? Shortly thereafter, attorneys
began to use computer-animated videotapes in civil cases involving
toxic spills, building collapses, shipwrecks and other transportation
accidents.8 Thus, admissibility into evidence, while not automatic, be-
gan to "enjoy precedent."9 Within the last few years, technological
advances have brought animation within the budget of a large number
of civil cases. 1° As a result, the use of computer-animated videotapes in
civil trials has become commonplace."
Commentators express concern about the potential problems that
the use of computer-animated evidence poses in the context of crimi-
nal prosecutions.' 2 Although computer animation may be appropriate
in civil trials, according to one commentator, it. is "extraordinarily
prejudicial" in criminal cases." As a result, courts hold that because
criminal defendants have a transcendent interest in the outcome of
their trials, a stricter standard for the admissibility of computer-ani-
mated evidence must be used in criminal, as opposed to civil, cases.m
Critics of animation also contend that the use of such evidence
transcends the bounds of the traditional rules of evidence.' 5 First, they
suggest that animations constitute hearsay. 16 Because animations do
Importantly, demonstrative evidence has no probative value beyond the testimony it illustrates.
Roy Krieger, Getting It Admitted, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 96 [hereinafter Krieger, Admitted]. In
addition, demonstrative evidence is not allowed to be viewed by the jury during its deliberation.
Id. Thus, the usefulness of animated videotapes used as demonstrative evidence and the risks
posed to their opponents are limited. See id. Consequently, animations are generally admissible
as demonstrative evidence as long as a proper foundation is laid. Elaine M. Chaney, Note,
Computer Simulations: How They Can Be Used at That and the Arguments for Admissibility, 19 IND.
L. Rev. 735, 742 (1986). Because the use of animations as demonstrative evidence is not generally
controversial, this Note focuses on the admissibility of animations as substantive evidence.
7 Roy Krieger, Now Showing at a Courtroom Near You, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 92, 92-93
[hereinafter Krieger, Now Showing]. The trial, Connors v. United States, involved the August 2,
1985 crash of Delta flight 191 at Dallas/Ft. Worth Airport. Id. at 92; see also Paul Marcotte,
Animated Evidence: Delta 191 Crash Re
-created Through Computer Simulations at Tria4 A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1989, at 52, 52-56.
Id. at 93.
9 1d.
1 ° Id. The cost of computer-animated evidence has decreased dramatically in recent years.
Thomas Brown, Animation Adds A New Dimension, NAT'L Lj., May 27, 1991, at 19. Only a kw
years ago, the average cost of a computer-animated videotape ranged from $50,000 to $100,000.
Id. Today, special demonstrative evidence firms can create life-like videotapes at costs ranging
from $5,000 to $40,000. Id.
71 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 1.
12 /d. at 32. See also infra notes 149-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
potential shortcomings of computer-animated evidence in criminal prosecutions.
13
 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
14 See Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958); see also United States v. Downing, 753
F.2d 1224, 1235-36 (3d Cir. 1985); New Jersey v. Johnson, 199 A.2d 809, 823 (1964).
13 Bulkeley, supra note 3, at Bl.
See infra notes 288-99 and accompanying text.
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not fit into any of the exceptions to the hearsay rule, they are, by
definition, inadmissible.''' Second, commentators contend that the ad-
mission into evidence of a computer-animated videotape will often
unfairly prejudice a criminal defendant, mislead the jury and consti-
tute a cumulative presentation of evidence." Finally, the critics claim
that animations often contain undetected inaccuracies.' Advocates, on
the other hand, claim that animations are the best way to clarify
complex issues for jurors who are accustomed to receiving information
from television.20
 The usefulness of the evidence, according to anima-
tions' advocates, overshadows any prejudicial impact that it might have
upon a jury. 2 '
The two conflicting views with respect to the computer-animated
evidence have led to much recent debate over the admissibility of such
evidence." This debate has been particularly fervent with respect to
criminal prosecutions, where loss of life and liberty may be the cost of
an improper decision as to admissibility." Given the diminished cost
of computer-animated evidence and the subsequent increase in its
availability and use at trial, the time has come for legislatures to defini-
tively address the issue of its admissibility at tria1. 24
This Note analyzes the admissibility of computer-animated vide-
otapes and concludes that the currently available standards of admis-
sibility are inadequate to address the special problems posed by com-
puter-animated evidence. 25
 Section I examines the process used to
produce computer-animated evidence and its uses at tria1. 26 Section II
describes the methods by which animated videos may be admitted into
substantive evidence. 27
 Section III examines the rule against hearsay
under the Federal Rules of Evidence and the "catchall exception" to
determine whether computer-animated evidence fits into this excep-
17 FED. R. Evil). 802.
Itt See infra notes 151-85 and accompanying text.
. 19 Seefane B. Baird, New From the Computer: 'Cartoons' for the Courtroom, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6,
1992, at C5; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32; Fred Strasser, The Video Verdict, NAT'L
L.J.June 23, 1986, at 1. Sec infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text for a discussion of a case
involving inaccurate videotape evidence.
2° See Bulkeley, supra note 3, at 131; Baird, supra note 19, at C5.
21 See Chaney, supra note 6, at 759; Bulkeley, supra note 3, at B 1.
22 See Bulkeley, supra note 3, at Bl.
23 See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
24 See Bulkeley, supra note 3, at B1; Sherman, supra note 1, at 32.
25 See infra notes 279-305 and accompanying text. Although this Note discusses several civil
cases that involved computer-animated evidence to illustrate how this evidence is used, this Note
focuses on the admissibility of animated videos in criminal prosecutions because this is where the
controversy exists.
26 See infra notes 30-185 and accompanying text.
27 See infra notes 186-248 and accompanying text.
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tion.28 Section IV analyzes the admissibility of computer-animated vide-
otapes in criminal prosecutions and proposes an addition to the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence in an effort to address the numerous problems
surrounding the admissibility of such evidence. 29
I. THE PRODUCTION OF COMPUTER-ANIMATED EVIDENCE AND
ITS USE AT TRIAL
Understanding what animation is, and how it is produced, are
essential prerequisites to evaluating the reliability and accuracy of
computer-animated evidence." In addition, an examination of cases
involving the admissibility of computer-animated evidence is useful as
a means of assessing the potential shortcomings of such evidence. 51
Finally, a review of commentators' criticisms of computer-animated
evidence may elucidate some of the potential shortcomings of this
form of evidence.32
A. Computer Animation: What Is It and How Is It Produced?
In order to adequately assess the reliability and accuracy of com-
puter-animated evidence, it is necessary to first understand what an
animation is" and how it is produced." The production process for
computer-animated evidence consists of five steps." These are: (1)
creating the storyboard, (2) modeling, (3) animating, (4) rendering
and (5) performing post-production processes."
The initial step in the production of an animation is the creation
of the storyboard. 37 The storyboard is a script that describes how the
animation's key elements are to be visually portrayed." It describes the
"flow and content" of the animation." The storyboard consists of
drawings and accompanying text that describe the content, movement,
28 See infra notes 249-78 and accompanying text.
29 See infra notes 279-306 and accompanying text.
"See Ian S. Jones et al,, Computer Animation: Admissibility in the Courtroom, Forensic Tech.
Int'l, at 4 (on file with Boston College Law Review).
51 See infra notes 69-148 and accompanying text.
52 See infra notes 149-85 and accompanying text.
55 A computer generated animation is a series of still images created on a computer, which
are subsequently recorded one at a time onto a videotape. Jones, supra note 30, at 1. When these
still images are played back, the result is a moving picture or animation. Id. at 2.
See id. at 4.
55
 Id. at 4-5.
36 Id.
37 Id. at 4.
38 Junes, supra note 30, at 4.
39 Id.
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camera motion, viewpoints and colors that are to be used in the
animation." Legal commentators observe a great potential for danger
in this phase of the production process because the writers of the script
for the animation (both the animator and his or her client) have a
vested interest in the outcome of the case.0
The second step in the production process is to create computer
models of the objects that are to be depicted in the animation."
Constructing the model is a two-step process." First, the geometry of
the objects is entered into the computer." The second step is to assign
the objects their crucial properties such as color, reflectivity and sur-
face texture." It is the addition of these properties that leads to the
photorealistic quality of the resulting animation."
Once the storyboard and the models are completed, the creator
essentially has a script and a set of actors. 47 The next step is creating
the motion and adding cameras and lights to the litigants' alleged
story." Two methods exist for controlling the motion of the objects."
First, the animator can manually move the objects, camera and the
lights within the scene.5° When this method is used, the animator
completely determines the motion of the objects. 5 ' Alternatively, the
motion may be generated by an external process such as through the
output from a computer simulation or the calculations of an expert. 52
During the fourth step of production, the actual animated vide-
otape is produced.° The animator, at this point, utilizes a computer to
process data describing lighting conditions, camera positions, optical
characteristics of the materials defining the objects and the geometry
of the objects.54 Then, the computer renders each still frame to create
40 a
41 See Michael Kennedy, Videos Are Dangerous To fusiice, at 1 (on file with Boston College Law
Review); Science and 'Technology Week (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 29, 1992).
42 tones, supra note 30, at 4. It is important to note that it is the animator, as directed by the
client, who creates the models for the animation. See id.
45 Id.
44 1d. This is generally accomplished by breaking down complex objects so that they can be
described by several simpler geometries such as planes, spheres or cubes. M.
45 id .
46 Jones, supra note 30, at 4.
47 1d.
48 id,
49 a
5" Id.
51 Jones, supra note 30, at 4.
52 Id,
55 Id, at 5.
54 1d.
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photorealistic quality images." Once all of the frames are rendered,
these images are recorded on a videotape.56 Finally, once the animator
records the images on the videotape, the post-production processes are
performed.57 Importantly, once again, this phase of the production
process enables an interested party to create "substantive evidence" for
use at trial." At this stage, the animator edits the videotape and may
add special effects and text captions."
Once computer-animated evidence is created, the leading produc-
ers of such displays claim extraordinary success rates with respect to
admissibility. 6° Forensic Technologies International has offered into
evidence eighty of the more than five hundred animations it has
created.6 ' The animations have been excluded in only two cases. 62 A
second producer of animations, Litigation Services, Inc., has offered
60 of its approximately 175 animations into evidence.63 According to a
spokesperson for Litigation Services, Inc., none of the company's ani-
mations have been excluded from evidence. 64 Finally, Legal Graphic
Communicators, Inc., a third important competitor in a field that also
includes dozens of smaller shops, has had all of its more than 100
animations admitted into evidence."
It is important to note that it is the creator of the animation, under
the direction of his or her client (i.e., the litigant or his or her attor-
ney), who carries out each of the five steps of production. 66 Commen-
tators contend that because each of these parties has a vested interest
in the outcome of the case, a strong incentive exists for these individu-
als to prepare animations in a biased fashion 67 In addition, some
commentators claim that the animation process mandates the use of
speculation in order to create a continuous display and, as a result, will
lead to the production of inaccurate evidence. 68
5.5
56 Jones, supra note 30, at 5.
57 Id.
58 See Sherman, supra note 1, at 32.
5° Jones, supra note 30, at 5.
6° See Roger Parloff, Now Showing in a Courtroom Near You, AM. LAW., May 1990, at 4, 10, 12.
The statistics given by the firms do not indicate whether the animations were admitted as
demonstrative or substantive evidence. See id.
61 a at 10.
62 Id.
" Id. at 12.
64 Id.
65 Parloff, supra note 60, at 12.
col See Sherman, supra note 1, it 32.
67 See id.
°Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32; see also Science and Tectrrwlogy Week, supra
note 41.
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B. Case Law Involving the Admissibility of Computer-Animated Evidence
Because the use of computer-animated evidence is a new techno-
logical development, there is not a highly developed body of case law
in the area.C9 Furthermore, in the few cases published, judges have
failed to state explicitly their reasoning regarding the admissibility of
computer-animated evidence." Nevertheless, an examination of cases
involving the admissibility of computer-animated evidence is useful as
a means of assessing the potential shortcomings of such evidence, 7 '
In the 1989 case of 'Testa v. Texaco, the Superior Court of the State
of Delaware admitted an animation that demonstrated how a vent pipe
would have fallen under each of two alternative theories. 72 In Testa, the
plaintiff was injured when a vent pipe fell, striking him in the head."
After evaluating the motion of the falling pipe, an expert concluded
that the collapse was caused by a failed weld rather than a rusted bolt."
Based on the expert's opinion, the plaintiff created an animation
showing how the pipe would have fallen under each alternative." The
court held that the animation was admissible because it would help the
jury to understand how the accident occurred."
Similarly, in the 1989 case of Gonzales v. Astroworld, the District
Court of Texas allowed an animation of a roller coaster ride to be
admitted into evidence." In Gonzales, the plaintiff alleged that a roller
coaster's inadequate upper body restraints led to the tearing of his
artery and ultimately to his suffering a stroke." The plaintiff ordered
the preparation of a computer animation of the roller coaster, showing
an android on the ride, and depicting with arrows the "g-forces" being
exerted on a passenger's head." The six-minute video was based en-
69
 When this Note went to publication, in the criminal context, the case of People v. Mcl-htgh
was the only published case dealing with the admissibility of computer-animated evidence. 476
N.Y.S.2d 721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). Further, because most cases in the civil context occurred in
lower level state courts, these decisions were generally unavailable.
7° See McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722-23; D.W. Luczak et. al., Computer Animations: A Resource
Manual for Litigators, Forensic Tech. In t'1,4:1 -17 (1989) (on file with Boston College Law Review).
71 See infra notes 69-148 and accompanying text.
72 Luczak et al., supra note 70, at 4:8 (citing Testa v. Texaco, 87 CMR 72 (Del. Super. Ct.
l989)).
73 Id,
74 Id,
75 Id.
" Id.
77 Gonzales v. Astroworld, 85-84362 (Tex. Dist. Ct. 1989). In this case, the defendant ulti-
mately stipulated to the admissibility of the animation. Parloff, supra note 60, at B.
78 Parloff, supra note 60, at 8.
79 M.
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tirely on data obtained from the defendant." After the defendant
viewed the animation, the case was settled in favor of the plaintiff.'"
In another recent decision involving computer animation, the
trial court admitted into evidence a videotape that purported to illus-
trate the line of sight of a pilot frOm the cockpit of an airplane." The
video, however, was actually taken from the wrong angle." Thus, it
became necessary for the defense to create its own animation in order
to expose the inaccuracy of the plaintiffs videotape. 84
In Feaster v. New York City Transit Authority, however, the New York
Supreme Court held the defendant's animated videotapes inadmissi-
ble." In this case, the plaintiff fell onto the subway tracks and was run
over by a subway car." As a result, part of his leg was amputated." The
trial court excluded the defendant's computer-generated video simu-
lation of the accident." On appeal, the Appellate Division of the
Supreme Court affirmed, stating that the admissibility of the animated
videotape should have been left to the sound discretion of the trial
court."
In 1984, in People v. McHugh, the New York Supreme Court be-
came the first court to allow the introduction of a computer-animated
videotape in a criminal trial." More specifically, in McHugh, the court
held that no pre-trial Frye hearing was necessary to determine the
admissibility of the evidence. 91 The prosecution in this vehicular homi-
cide case alleged that the defendant was drunk while driving his car at
8° Id. The plaintiff obtained construction drawings of the roller coaster and accelerometer
readings from the defendant. Id.
81 See Luczak et al., supra note 70, at 4:16.
82 Strasser, supra note 19, at 22. The secondary source from which the information about
this unpublished opinion was obtained provides neither the name of the case nor the court in
which it was tried. Id.
83 Id.
Id,
85 Parton', supra note 60, at 10, 12.
86
 Feaster v. New York Transit Audi., 568 N.Y.S.2d 380, 381 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991).
87 Id.
88 Parloff, supra note 60, at 10, 12.
89 Feaster, 568 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
9°476 N.Y.S.2d 721, 722 (N.Y. Sup, Ct, 1984); Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at
32. The case involved a vehicular homicide, and the animation depicted the motion of a car, not
a person. See id.
91 McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722. See infra notes 195-210 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Frye test and its applicability to computer animated evidence. In jurisdictions
that have adopted the Frye standard, animated evidence must satisfy the traditional requirements
of relevancy, accuracy, fairness and helpfulness, as well as be generally accepted within the
relevant scientific community. Mark McCormick, Scientific Evidence: Defining A New Approach to
Admissibility, 67 IowA L. REV. 879, 882 (1982).
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a speed of eighty miles per hour. 92 As a result, according to the state,
McHugh lost control of the vehicle, struck a wall and killed his four
teenage passengers."
The defendant denied both intoxication and speeding." Rather,
McHugh claimed that the accident occurred when the poor weather
conditions caused his car to swerve off the road and hit an uncovered,
ground-level electrical box." As a result, the defendant contended that
his tire was ruptured, causing his car to spin into a concrete wal1. 96 The
defendant attempted to demonstrate his theory by a computer reen-
actment of his version of the accident.97
Before trial, the District Attorney moved for a Frye hearing to
determine whether the underlying computer program and its formu-
lae, techniques and processes were generally accepted as accurate and
reliable by the scientific community. 96 The New York Supreme Court
held that no such pre-trial hearing was required. 99 The court ruled that
as long as the defendant's counsel laid an adequate foundation and
qualified the expert witness, the animation could be admitted at trial.'"
Further, the court explained that the District Attorney had the oppor-
tunity to conduct a voir dire examination after the animation was
offered at trial. 10 ' Therefore, the court held that a Frye hearing was not
a prerequisite to the admission of computer-animated evidence." 2
Finally, the court concluded that the video presented in this case
was admissible.'" The court reasoned that the animation was not a
scientific device, but was analogous to a simple chart or diagram."' The
court found that because the videotape was relevant to a possible
defense, fairly and accurately reflected the oral testimony to be offered
and was an aid to the jury's understanding of the issue, a Frye hearing
was unnecessary."'
92 Luczak et al., supra note 70, at 4:1. The defendant, Michael McHugh, was charged with
four counts of second degree manslaughter and driving while intoxicated. McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d
at 722.
99 Luczak et al., supra note 70, at 4:1.
94 McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
95 1d.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 Id.
99 McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
100 Id.
Ku id .
102 See id.
1 °3 Id.
104
 McHugh, 476 N.Y.S.2d at 722.
105 See id.
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In 1988, an Arizona Superior Court similarly considered whether
an animated videotape ought to be admitted in a criminal prosecu-
tion. 1 °5 In Arizona v. Phillips, the court held that the prosecution's
animated videotape of a shooting was admissible evidence. 107 The de-
fendant had contended that a gun allegedly used to shoot the victim
was fired a significant distance from the victim.' 08 Further, he claimed
that as a result of his position at the time of the shooting, it was
impossible for him to have shot the victim. 109 In an effort to refute the
defendant's claims, the prosecution created an animation purportedly
proving that the gun had been held against the victim's head when it
was fired."° The court allowed the animation into evidence.'"
In State v. Rollins, the Palm Beach Circuit Court excluded the
defendant's computer-animated videotape from evidence."' In Rollins,
two police officers had fallen over a curb while attempting to arrest a
suspect." 3 As a result, the prisoner, Robert Jewett, was "sandwiched"
between the two officers and mortally wounded. 114
The prosecution alleged that Officer Rollins was criminally at fault
because he had his arm across Mr. Jewett's neck while standing behind
him."5 The prosecution posited that when the three men fell, Officer
Rollins killed Mr. Jewett by "snapping his neck." The defense, how-
ever, claimed that Officer Rollins' arm was around Mr. Jewett's chest
and inadvertently slipped to Mr. Jewett's neck during the fall.'" The
defense created a computer-animated videotape to depict its version
of the events. 18 The court ruled the evidence inadmissible.'"
In the 1991 case of New Jersey v. Spath, the Superior Court of New
Jersey held admissible the prosecution's animated videotape that pur-
196 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32 (citing Arizona v. Phillips, 87-365 (Ariz.
Super. Ct. 1988)).
1 °1 See id.
1 °9 Id.
109 Id.
110 Id.
I" See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32. The court's opinion in this case is
unpublished; the secondary source seems to indicate that the court offered little reasoning for
its decision. See id.
112 Id. at 33.
113 Id.
114 Id. Officer Lee Rollins, wearing a steel-plated bullet proof vest, landed on the bottom of
the pile. Id. Officer Glen Thurlon (6'4", 245 pounds) landed on top of Mr. Jewett. Id.
115 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 33.
116 1d.
117 Id.
"8 Id.
"9 Id.
September 1993]	 LIGHTS, CAMERA, ACTION	 1097
ported to recreate certain aspects of a murder.'" On April 10, 1990,
Police Officer Gary Spath fatally shot sixteen-year-old Philip Panne11. 121
The officer claimed that he shot the youth "in self defense.” 122
 More
specifically, he alleged that Philip Pannell's left arm was down and it
appeared as if he was reaching for his pocket, where a gun was sub-
sequently found.'"
The prosecution argued that the shooting was criminally reckless
because Philip Pannell's left arm was actually "raised in surrender. "124
The prosecution sought to introduce an animated video that showed
a series of scenarios in which a light (representing the two bullets) hit
a red coat (similar to the one worn by Philip Pannell) when models
(representing Mr. Pannell) held their arms in various positions. 12' The
animation was intended to show where the models' left arms had to
be for the hole in the coat to coincide with the bullet wound on
Pannell's back. 12 "
The defense vehemently objected to the admission of the video. 127
The defense lawyer claimed that the admission of the video was ex-
tremely dangerous and prejudicia1. 128 He stated, "[t]he people that are
offering it into evidence are the same people who produce it, direct
it, and star in it. Then they get on the stand and critique it."'" The
judge, however, did not agree with the arguments of defense counsel.'"
As a result, he held that the animation was admissible."'
Similarly, in the 1992 case of People v. Mitchell, the Superior Court
of Marin County, California admitted into evidence for the first time
in a murder prosecution a computer-animated videotape. 132
 The prose-
cution alleged that the defendant, Jim Mitchell, killed his brother)"
P20 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32 (citing New jersey v. Spath, Sq263903
(1991)). Although the judge held that the prosecution's video was admissible, at trial a live
demonstration was used instead, Id,
1211d .
122 1d.
129 Id.
124 Id.
125 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
126/d .
127 1d,
158 Id.
129 Id.
130 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
131 Id. Subsequently, the judge stated, "I thought in this particular case it would be invaluable
to understand what the expert was testifying to." Id.
132 Science and Technology Week, supra note 41.
199 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32 (citing People v. Mitchell, 12462 (Cal.
Super. Ct. 1992)),
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Jim Mitchell claimed that he "blanked out" and, thus, could remember
no details of his brother's murder.'"
The prosecution created a one-minute animation to show that the
victim's position and the timing of the murder proved the killing was
a deliberate, premeditated act."5
 To create the animation, the prose-
cution used information from the autopsy and police reports and its
own crime scene investigation.' 36
 The animation showed eight flashes
representing bullets moving in time intervals across the screen through
doors, walls and a figure representing the alleged murder victim.'"
Three flashes struck the body.'" Next, the fatal bullet passed through
the figure's right eye, thrusting it against the wall.'" At that point, the
figure slumped to the floor.'" The judge required that the prosecution
make several alterations to the animation before it was admitted into
evidence.' 4' Specifically, in the original video, the robot representing
the victim moved from the bedroom to the hallway with its arms at its
side.142 Defense counsel objected to the figure's unthreatening stance
because there was no evidence indicating the position of the victim's
body at the time of the alleged murder.'" The animation was sub-
sequently modified.'" Instead of the figure, a gray dot was used to
depict the victim in the animation.'"
The defendant was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter.'" Now
on appeal, the defense in Mitchell claims that the video was "funda-
mentally dishonest." 147
 In the defense counsel's opinion, video or com-
puter images cannot effectively recreate the human gestures that are
necessary for a jury in determining intent, motive, malice and "the
level of complicity" in homicide.'"
134 Science and `Technology Week, supra note 41.
133 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
136 Science and Technology Week, supra note 41.
137 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
'38 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 33.
1421d.
143 Id. The defense claimed that the victim approached his brother with what appeared to
be a gun in his hand. Id.
' 44 Id.
143 Id.
146
 Science and Technology Week, supra note 41; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at
32. He was, however, acquitted of first-degree manslaughter. Id.
147 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
148 Id.
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C. Potential Shortcomings of Computer-Animated Evidence
The cases described in the preceding section have not gone un-
criticized."' Many commentators have expressed serious concern over
the lack of protection provided to the opponents of computer-ani-
mated evidence.'" The two main criticisms of computer-animated evi-
dence are that: (1) the flawed production process may lead to unde-
tected inaccuracies in the animations; and (2) the use of
computer-animated evidence will unfairly prejudice an opponent at
trial and thereby mislead the jury. 15 '
Commentators claim that the animation production process does
not adequately protect litigants against inaccuracies in animations that
are used against them.'" First, these critics point out that all parties
involved with the production of an animation—the animator, the at-
torney, the expert witness and the party to the case—have a vested
interest in the outcome of the case.'" They assert that the individuals
who are offering the animation into evidence are the same people who
design it, create it and edit it.'" These commentators claim, further,
that it is the animator who then serves as an expert witness and
critiques his or her own work. 155
 Commentators thus conclude that a
strong incentive exists for these interested parties to prepare computer-
animated evidence in a biased fashion.' 5 "
Next, commentators contend that the actual animation produc-
tion process inevitably leads to inaccuracies in computer-animated
evidence.'" These critics believe that animators may "introduce specu-
lation" in their effort to create a continuous display. 18 They also con-
kg
 See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note i, at 32-33; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2;
Science and '!'ethnology Week, supra note 41.
1511 See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at 32; Rorie Sherman, Psychological Impact
Is Unclear, NAT'L 14, April 0,1992, at 33 [hereinafter, Sherman, impact]; Kennedy, supra note
41, at 1 -2; Science and Thchnolop Week, supra note 41.
151 See Sherman, Impact, supra note 150, at 33; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and
Technology Week, supra note 41.
132 See'Baird, supra note 19; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32; Strasser, supra
note 19, at 1; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2.
153 See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at 32; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2.
154 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 52; see also Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2.
155 Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32.
166 See Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2.
157 See Baird, supra note 19; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at 32; Strasser, supra
note 19, at 1 .
15" Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at 32; see also Science and Technology Week, supra
note 41. For example, an animator tnay incorrectly assume the location of a victim's arms at the
time of a murder. See Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 33.
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tend that the animators will often make faulty assumptions about the
evidence. 159
 In addition, commentators also assert that because human
beings actually enter the information into the computer, the possibility
of human error is great.'" Moreover, they maintain that video has the
potential to distort images simply by its production technique.' 6' In
other words, the output and the process are additional sources of
error.' 62
 Even Forensic Technologies International, one of the largest
creators of computer-animated evidence, professes virtual certainty
that computer animators' evidence will make errors that can sig-
nificantly affect the outcome of cases.'" Furthermore, critics assert that
the danger presented by the various sources of inaccuracies in ani-
mated videotapes is amplified by the difficulty of discovering the errors
and the tendency of human beings to believe that the animations
constitute the truth)" Finally, some commentators believe that even if
an animation is able to adequately replicate the linear motion of an
object such as airplane or car, the production process is simply not
sufficiently sophisticated to accurately recreate the movement of a
human being.'" Commentators thus conclude that the actual anima-
tion process inevitably leads to inaccuracies in computer-animated
evidence.'"
The second major criticism of computer-animated evidence is that
it unfairly prejudices an opponent at trial and misleads the jury.' 67
Unfair prejudice is defined as "an undue tendency to suggest [the
making of all decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not
necessarily, an emotional one."'" Many lawyers fear the psychological
1 r'° Science and Technoloo Week, supra note 41.
III 1 13aird, supra note 19; Parloff, supra note 60, al 8.
16] Strasser, supra note 19, at 1,
162 See id. at 1,22.
165 Forensic Tech. Intl, Challenging Computer-Based "Evidence" (on file with Boston College
Law Review). Forensic Technologies International contends,
[w]ith the same degree of certainty that you might predict death and taxes, you
can be confident that human beings who put together the computer-based evidence
for the other side have made mistakes—mistakes that could have an impoAant
impact on the outcome of your case.
Id.
164
 Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1 -2; Science and Technology Week, supra note 41.
I 65 Sherman, Moving Pictures, supra note 1, at 32; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2. For
example, it is impossible to know how a person's muscles reacted to a fall, or the exact location
of a victim's arms at the time of a murder. See Sherman, Moving Pictures, supra note 1, at 32.
166 See Baird, supra note 19, at 5; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note I, at 32; Strasser,
supra note 19, at 1.
167
 Sherman, impact, supra note 150, at 33; see also Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1,
at 32; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and Technology Week, supra note 41.
166 Fm. R. Evil), 403, advisory committee's note.
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impact that computer-animated evidence will have on juries.'" More
specifically, lawyers are concerned that extraneous information in the
animation might accidentally trigger juror biases and that the material
might contain "subliminal messages." 17° Further, they contend that
allowing the trier of fact to view an animation depicting a murder, or
other crime, invites a verdict based upon emotion rather than objective
fact."'
Similarly, commentators believe that computer-animated evidence
tends to mislead juries.' 72
 More specifically, they claim that the mem-
bers of the jury may overestimate the value of computer-animated
evidence.'" These critics profess that the overestimation of the value
of animated evidence stems from (1) the human ability to retain visual
images more effectively than verbal statements, and (2) the tendency
of humans to believe that what they see is the truth.' 74
First, commentators claim that because individuals retain visual
displays more effectively than verbal statements, jurors will overempha-
size computer-animated evidence.'" They maintain that visualization is
the key ingredient in understanding.'" In this view, they point out that
neurophysiologists contend that one-third of the human brain is de-
voted exclusively to visual memory.' 77
 These commentators rely upon
a study that concluded that the use of visual, as opposed to oral,
presentations increase juror retention 100%. 178 Further, the study
showed that juror retention increases 650% when combined visual and
oral presentations are used instead of solely oral evidence. 179 Experts
generally agree that information is far more memorable and persuasive
when it comes in a moving, pictorial form.'" Thus, some commentators
"Sherman, impart, supra note 150, at 33.
179 ,fd. The animation might, for example, contain subliminal messages that one litigant is at
fault or simply is an evil person.
171
 Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; see also Gibson v. Gunn, 202 N.Y.S. 19, 20 (N.Y. App. Div.
1923) ("the moving pictures present a fertile field for exaggeration of any emotion or action ...
"), aff'd on rehk, 202 N.Y.S. 927 (1924).
172 See Sherman, Itnpact, .supra note 150, at 33; Kennedy, ,supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and
Technology; Week, supra note 41.
II" See Science and Technology Week, supra note 41; Krieger, Now Showing, supra note 7, at 92;
Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2.
174 Krieger, Now Showing, supra note 7, at 92; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and
Technology Week, supra note 41.
175 See Krieger, Now Showing, supra note 7, at 92; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1
-2; Science and
Technology Week, supra note 43.
176 Krieger, Now Showing, supra note 7, at 92.
177 Id.
175 Id.
179 Id.
1 " See, e.g., Brown, supra note 10, at 19; News (CNN television broadcast, Oct. 12, 1992).
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contend that there is a great danger that the presentation of computer-
animated evidence will overshadow all other evidence presented in the
case. 18' These critics claim that, as a result, when the jury goes into the
room to deliberate, the computer-animated evidence will be the only
image that they remember. 182
Finally, critics assert that because animated evidence is such a
powerful portrayal of "facts," jurors will not realize that the video is
merely one party's account of the events.'" In other words, they fear
that juries may accept the animation as true rather than subjecting it
to critical analysis. 184 Thus, these commentators believe that computer-
animated evidence tends to mislead jurors.' 85
H. POTENTIAL STANDARDS FOR ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE IN THE
FORM OF ANIMATED VIDEOTAPES
In assessing the admissibility of computer-animated evidence, it is
essential to examine the ability of current evidentiary standards to
adequately protect the rights of the parties to a litigation.' 86 Initially,
for animated evidence to be admissible, an adequate foundation must
be established.'" The foundation should establish the trustworthiness
of the data used to create the animation.'" In addition, the foundation
must ensure the reliability of all calculations and assumptions used in
analyzing the underlying data.' 86 Finally, the foundation must demon-
strate the accuracy of (a) the input process; (b) the operation and
capability of the computer and software; (c) the output process; (d)
the medium used to reproduce the computer graphics for presentation
at trial (i.e., the videotape); and (e) the final presentation itself.' 9°
Once an adequate foundation has been established, the propo-
nent of the animated evidence must satisfy the applicable admissibility
standard of evidence. 19 ' Two potential standards exist for evaluating
181 News, supra note 180.
182 Id.
' 85
 News, supra note 180; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and 'Technology Week, supra
note 41.
184 Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1
-2; see also News, supra note 180; Science and Technology Week.
supra note 41.
185 See Sherman, Impact, supra note 150, at 33; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Science and
Technology Week, supra note 41.
186
 See Chaney, supra note 6, at 740-41; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
187 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
188 Id.
189 Id.
19° Id.
191 Id.; Chaney, supra note 6, at 740-41.
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the admissibility of animated videotapes as substantive evidence: (1)
the Frye standard of general acceptance in the relevant scientific com-
munity, and (2) the standard as stated in the codified rules of evi-
dence.' 92
 In jurisdictions that have adopted the Frye standard, animated
evidence must satisfy the traditional requirements of relevancy, accu-
racy, fairness and helpfulness, as well as be generally accepted within
the relevant scientific community. 193
 Conversely, in jurisdictions adopt-
ing the Federal Rules of Evidence, requirements of authentication,
relevancy, the balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 and
expert testimony must all be satisfied. 194
A. The Frye Standard of General Acceptance in the
Relevant Scientific Community
In the 1923 case of Frye v. United States, the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia established the "general accep-
tance" standard for the admissibility of scientific evidence.m The ap-
pellant, Frye, was tried for murder, and sought to prove his innocence
by introducing evidence of the results of a systolic blood pressure test,
a predecessor to the modern polygraph test.'" The court announced
that in order for scientific evidence to be admissible, the proponent
must establish that the evidence is generally accepted by the interested
scientific community.' 97
 After enunciating this standard, the court de-
termined that the systolic blood pressure test was not generally ac-
cepted among the physiological and psychological authorities.' 98 Con-
sequently, the results of the test were inadmissible.' 99
Shortly after the Frye decision, many courts adopted the general
acceptance standard."° During the last two decades, however, the Frye
192
 Chancy, supra note 6, at 740-41; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96. See infra note 209
for a discussion of which jurisdictions have adopted the Frye standard and which have adopted
the "relevancy approach." Throughout this Note, the phrase "relevancy approach" will be used
to describe the admissibility standard for evidence under the Federal Rules of Evidence. In
addition, the phrase "codified rules of evidence" will be used to refer to both the Federal Rules
of Evidence and its state law equivalents. It is important to note that in all jurisdictions, attorneys
may also attempt to admit an animation as demonstrative evidence to illustrate or clarify testimony
to the trier of filet. See Chancy, supra note 6, at 742; see supra note 6 for a discussion of the
common law principles of demonstrative evidence.
193 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; McCormick, supra note 92, at 882.
194
 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; see also Chaney, supra note 6, at 753-54.
195 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
196 /d. at 1013-14.
'97 1d. at 1014.
195
199 Id.
299 McCormick, supra note 91, at 883. See, e.g., Kaminski v. State, 63 So. 2c1 339, 340 (Fla.
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standard has been subject to sustained attack. 24' Commentators have
three primary criticisms of the Frye standard. 242 First, it is difficult to
identify the relevant scientific field." Second, the vague nature of the
phrase "general acceptance" makes the standard ambiguous. 2" Third,
critics contend that the Frye standard prevents reliable, relevant evi-
dence from reaching the trier of fact. 2" They claim that the Frye
jurisdictions will inevitably lag behind technological advances, while
their courts wait for novel scientific techniques to gain general accep-
tance.2" They claim, therefore, that Frye thwarts rather than promotes
the search for truth. 207
The recognized shortcomings of the Frye standard have resulted
in a trend away from the Frye standard, toward the relevancy approach
suggested by the Federal Rules of Evidence." Some jurisdictions, how-
ever, continue to use Frye as the admissibility standard for scientific
evidence." In these jurisdictions, the proponent of scientific evidence
must satisfy the traditional requirements of relevancy and helpfulness
to the trier of fact, as well as the requirement that the scientific
principle or technique be generally accepted in the scientific commu-
nity. 21 "
1953); Henderson v. State, 230 P.2d 495, 502-05 (Okla. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 898 (1951);
Boeche v. State, 37 N.W.2d 593, 597 (Neb. 1949).
201 McCormick, supra note 91, at 883, 885-86.
202 Frederick B. Lacey, Scientific Evidence, 24 Julumurnics J. 254, 265 (1984); Chancy, supra
note 6, at 747.
205 Chaney, supra note 6, at 747; Lacey, supra note 202, at 265.
204 Chaney, supra note 6, at 747; Lacey, supra note 202, at 265.
"Edward J. Imwinkelreid, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific Evidence—A Primer on
Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REv. 261, 265 (1981) thereinafter
Imwinkelreid, Evolution].
2°4 ' Id.; see also Lacey, supra note 202, at 265.
207 Chaney, supra note 6, at 748; Lacey, supra note 202, at 265.
216 Edward J. Imwinkelreid, The Standard for Admitting Scientific. Evidence: A Critique from the
Perspective of Juror Psychology, 100 Mu_ L. REV. 99, 100 (1983) [hereinafter Imwinkelreid, Juror
Psycholoio].
2Q9 Reagan, supra note 3, at *1; see also Gregory P. Joseph, 'Technology things New Legal Issues,
N.Y. Li., July 27, 1992, at S2. As of July 27, 1992, thirty-seven states had enacted evidence codes,
thirty-lbur of which were patterned after the Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. Alaska, Arizona,
Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina,
North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Vermont, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin and Wyoming adopted codes very similar to the
Federal Rules of Evidence. Id. at n.l. California, Kansas and New Jersey have distinct evidence
codes based upon the 1953 version of the Uniform Rules of Evidence. Id.
21° McCormick, supra note 91, at 882.
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B. The Admissibility Standard Under the Federal Rules of
Evidence—The Relevancy Approach
As noted above, there is a trend toward adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 2 " Further, the Federal Rules of Evidence and their
state law analogs are expected to eventually replace the Frye standard
altogether.212 These rules require only that evidence comply with four
general requirements to be admissible. 213 First, the proponent of such
evidence must establish authentication under Federal Rules 901(a)
and 001 (b) (9). 214 Second, an attorney seeking admission of computer-
animated evidence must demonstrate its relevancy under Rules 401
and 402.215 Third, the proponent of the animation must satisfy the Rule
403 balancing test. 215 Specifically, for evidence to be admissible, the
dangers of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and misleading the
jury must not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evi-
dence.217 Finally, an attorney seeking admission of computer-animated
evidence must satisfy Federal Rules of Evidence 702, 703, 704 and 705,
which pertain to expert testimony.215
All evidence must meet the minimum authentication require-
ments of Federal Rules of Evidence 901(a) and 901(b) (9). 219 Rule
211
	 juror Psychology, supra note 208, at 100.
212 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
215 Id. The relevancy approach holds novel scientific evidence to the same admissibility
standard as other evidence. Reagan, supra note 3, at *5. Courts following this approach admit
evidence as long as it is helpfbl to the trier of fact, irrespective of its general acceptance. Id.
Advocates of the relevancy approach contend that the Federal Rules of Evidence implicitly
overruled Frye, Id. Proponents of this view argue that the Federal Rules of Evidence have
established an admissibility standard inconsistent with Frye by allowing scientific evidence to be
deemed reliable and thus relevant under Rule 401 without regard to its general acceptance in
the scientific community. Id.
214 Chaney, supra note 6, at 753; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FEn. R. Evin. 901(a)
Mlle requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what its
proponent claims."); FED. R. Evil). 901(6)(9) ("By way of illustration only, and not by way of
limitation, the following arc examples of identification conforming with the requirements of this
rule ... (9) Process or system. Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result
and showing that the process or system produces an accurate result.").
2 I 5 Chaney, supra note 6, at 753-54; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
2111 Chaney, supra note 6, at 754; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
217 See FED. R. Evil). 403.
2 IHKrieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R. Evin. 702-05.
219 Randolph A. Bain & Cynthia A. King, Note, Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence
Generated By Computer For Purposes of Litigation, 15 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 951,954-55 (1982).
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901(a) declares that the authentication or identification requirement
is satisfied by evidence supporting a finding that the evidence is what
it purports to be. 22° Rule 901(b) (9) explains how to meet the 901(a)
requirements with respect to a process or system such as animation. 22 '
The requirement is satisfied by first establishing the inherent reliability
of the system or process used to produce the animation, and then
establishing the accuracy of its output. 222
Another of the Federal Rules of Evidence involved in admitting
computer-animated evidence is Rule 401, which sets out the basic
relevancy standard.'" The rule provides that evidence is relevant when
it has "any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence." 224
 Relevance depends
upon whether evidence is likely to promote the ascertainment of
truth."' Further, Federal Rule of Evidence 402 mandates that all rele-
vant evidence is admissible unless a constitutional, statutory or court
rule basis for exclusion exists."' As a result, an animation that meets
the 401 requirement is generally admissible as long as it meets the
other requirements of the Federal Rules of Evidence."'
Yet another of the Federal Rules of Evidence involved in admitting
computer-animated evidence is Rule 403. 228
 Federal Rule of Evidence
403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues or misleading the trier of fact."' Rule 403 was
created to prevent the admission of evidence with a tendency to sug-
gest a decision on an improper basis, such as evidence that appeals to
22° Fun, R. Even. 901(a).
221
 Bain & King, supra note 219, at 954-55; FED. R. Even. 901(b) (9),
222 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
225 FED. R. Even. 401.
224 Id.
225
 Chaney, supra note 6, at 754 (citing United States v. Krulewitch, 145 F.2d 76, 80 (2d Cir.
1944)).
226 FED. R. EVID. 402 ("All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by
the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by other rules
prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority. Evidence which is not relevant
is not admissible.").
227 See id.; Chaney, supra note 6, at 754.
228 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
225 Id.; FED. R. Eve D. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or mislead-
ing the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of rime, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.") ,
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jurors' sympathies, arouses their sense of horror, provokes their in-
stincts to punish or otherwise causes them to base their decision on
something other than the facts of the case. 230 Thus, a court may exclude
evidence when, after performing the Rule 403 balancing test, it decides
that the "costs of the evidence outweigh its benefits." 231 Therefore, to
be admissible, an animation must be fair, accurate and complete. 252 In
addition, its length must not be excessive and it must be unlikely to
delay or disrupt the trial. 233
Finally, because computer-animated evidence may constitute ex-
pert testimony, the expert testimony requirements of the Federal Rules
of Evidence—Rules 702, 703 and 705—must be satisfied. 2"4 Federal
Rule of Evidence 702 establishes that expert testimony "in the form of
an opinion or otherwise" is admissible as long as it "will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." 2"5
The language of Rule 702 permits expert testimony in a form other
than traditional opinion. 2"6 Rule 702 can serve as the means for the
admissibility of computer animations irrespective of whether the video
expresses expert conclusions or merely illustrates the basis of opinion
testimony by experts. 237
Rule 702 is constrained by the Rule 703 requirement of a reliable
basis for the opinion of an expert, 2" Rule 703 states that facts not
admissible as evidence, but upon which an expert bases an opinion,
must be "of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular
field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject." 2" As a result,
the opinion of the proponent of computer-animated evidence must be
based upon facts reasonably relied upon by experts in the field of
computer animation.""
JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE at 403-13, n.12
(1985).
" I Chaney, supra note 6, at 754 (citing United States v. Mangiameli, 668 EU 1172, 1176
(10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 918 (1982)).
232 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
253 Id.
234 1d.
233 Krieget; Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R. EVID. 702 (If scientific, technical, or other
specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a
fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
236grieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R, EVID. 702.
237 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
238 /d.; FED. R. Evil). 703.
239 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R. EvID. 703.
240 See Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R. Evil). 703.
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Testimony by an expert witness that satisfies Rules 702, 703 and
705241
 remains admissible even if it addresses an ultimate issue to be
decided by the trier of fact."' Specifically, Rule 704 prohibits the
exclusion of opinions and inferences on ultimate issues on that basis
alone.'" As a result, animated videotapes that are otherwise admissible
remain admissible even if they conclusively depict an ultimate issue in
dispute.'"
In sum, once an adequate foundation has been established, the
proponent of computer-animated evidence must satisfy the applicable
admissibility standard of evidence—the Frye standard of general accep-
tance in the relevant scientific community, or the standard as enunci-
ated in the codified rules of evidence.'" In jurisdictions that have
adopted the Frye standard, animated evidence must satisfy the tradi-
tional requirements of relevancy, accuracy, fairness and helpfulness, as
well as be generally accepted within the relevant scientific commu-
nity.'" Conversely, in jurisdictions adopting the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, requirements of authentication, relevancy, expert testimony
and the balancing test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403 must all be
satisfied."' Nevertheless, even after an adequate foundation is estab-
lished and the applicable admissibility standard of evidence is satisfied,
one hurdle remains—the hearsay rule. 298
III. THE HEARSAY RULE AND THE "CATCHALL EXCEPTION"
A common objection to the admission of computer-animated evi-
dence is that the videotape constitutes hearsay.'" If this objection is
valid, then the animation must fit within an exception to the hearsay
241
 Rule 705 provides that, The expert may ... be required to disclose the underlying facts
or data on cross-examination," FED. R. EVID. 705. Thus, Rule 705 makes available the opportunity
for opposing counsel to expose expert witnesses to vigorous inquiry or cross-examination. Krieger,
Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; see also FED. R. Evuo. 705. Therefore, Federal Rule of Evidence 705
also serves to increase the reliability of expert testimony. Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96;
see also FED. R. Evil). 705.
242 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; FED. R. EVID. 704.
213 FF.n. R. Evil). 704 ( - (Tiestimony in the form of an opinion or inference otherwise
admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate issue to be decided by the trier
of fact.").
244 Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96; see also FED. R. EVID. 704.
x45 Chaney, supra note 6, at 740-41; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
246 McCormick, supra note 91, at 882.
247 Charley, supra note 6, at 753-54; Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
2" See infra notes 249-78 and accompanying text for a discussion of the hearsay rule.
249 See Jerome j. Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. Ctn.
L. REV. 254, 272 (1974). See infra notes 253-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
Federal Rules of Evidence hearsay provisions,
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rule in order to be admissible as evidence. 250 To assess this objection
adequately, it is necessary first to examine the hearsay rule and any
potentially applicable exceptions.'"
Hearsay is "a statement,252 other than one made by the declarant
while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." 253 The Federal Rules of Evidence gener-
ally exclude hearsay evidence."' This general rule, however, is subject
to numerous exceptions under circumstances alleged to furnish guar-
antees of trustworthiness. 2" An important test in determining whether
testimony is hearsay is whether it is subject to cross-examination
through the witness who verifies it.2"
In addition to the numerous specific exceptions to the hearsay
rule, the Federal Rules of Evidence provide two "residual" or "catchall"
exceptions—Rule 803(24) 257 and Rule 804(b) (5).258 The language of
the two provisions is identical. 25• These residual clauses provide for the
250 See Roberts, supra note 249, at 272; see also Fen. R. Eva). 802 ("Hearsay is not admissible
except as provided by these rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant
to statutory authority or by Act of Congress.").
251 See Roberts, supra note 249, at 272. Hearsay analysis under common law is similar to the
analysis under the Federal Rules of Evidence. See 2 McCotaitcx ON EVIDENCE 97 (John William
Strong ed., 1992). As a result, although the discussion refers to the hearsay analysis under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, the same analysis is applied in all jurisdictions. See id.
252 "A 'statement' is (1) an oral or written assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if
it is intended by the person as an assertion." Fen. R. Evio. 801(a).
255 FED. R. Even. 801(c). Demonstrative, as opposed to substantive, evidence is not included
in the definition of hearsay. Chancy, supra note 6, at 756; see also Fan. R. Evto, 801(c). More
specifically, animations offered as demonstrative evidence are not offered to prove "the truth of
the matter asserted." Chaney, supra note 6, at 756; see also Fen. R. Evio. 801(c). As a result, they
do not constitute hearsay. Chaney, supra note 6, at 756. Thus, when admitting computer-animated
evidence as demonstrative evidence, the hearsay objection is inapplicable. See Chaney, supra note
6, at 756.
254 Fan. R. Evm. 802.
255 See, e.g., FED. R. Evto, 801, 803-04. These exceptions, however, simply fail to encompass
computer-animated evidence. See FED. R. Evil). 801(d), 803-04.
256 Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. R. Co., 205 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex. Ct .. App. 1947); Pierre R.
Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. Cow. L. Rev. 235, 262 (1965).
257 FED. R. EvID. 803(24). Rule 803(24) applies even in circumstances where the declarant
is available to testify. Id,
258 no. R. Evm. 804(h) (5). Rule 804(b) (5) only applies when the declarant is unavailable
to testify. FED. R. Evin. 804.
259 Compare FED. R. EVID. 804(b) (5) ("A statement not specifically covered by any of the
foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the
court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement
is more probative on the point For which it is offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules
and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.") with
FED. R. Evio. 803(24) ("A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court determines that
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admission of hearsay evidence even where the evidence does not fall
within one of the enumerated exceptions as long as certain conditions
are satisfied.26° In essence, the catchall exceptions provide that a state-
ment is admissible if its proponent satisfies certain threshold criteria
and demonstrates that the evidence has "circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness" equivalent to the enumerated exceptions. 26'
The catchall exceptions provided by Federal Rules 804(b) (5) and
803(24) were not intended to create broad, new hearsay exceptions. 262
Rather, Congress intended that the exceptions be used extremely spar-
ingly and only in "exceptional circumstances." 263
 The rules were de-
signed to fill in omissions of other exceptions and to allow for the
development of new general exceptions to the rule. 264 Thus, although
the catchall exceptions give federal courts the discretionary power to
admit hearsay evidence, their discretion is not unfettered. 265 Further,
hearsay not within an enumerated exception is "presumptively unreli-
able," and the burden of overcoming that presumption falls on the
party attempting to introduce the evidence.266
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more probative
on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can procure
through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the interests of justice
will best be served by admission of the statement into evidence.").
26°FEn. R. Evil). 803(24), 804(b)(5). It is important to note that in criminal cases the
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment might exclude hearsay evidence that would oth-
erwise be admissible under 803(24) of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Michael A. DiSabatino,
Annotation, Admissibility of Statement Under Rule 803(24) of Federal Rule of Evidence, Providing
for Admissibility of Hearsay Statement Not Covered By Any Specific Exception But Having Equivalent
Circumstantial Guarantees of Trustworthiness, 36 A.L.R. Fed. 742, 746 (1978); see also U.S. CONST.
amend. VI.
261 See FED. R. Evrn. 803(24), 804(b) (5). The threshold requirements of Federal Rules of
Evidence 803(24) and 804(b) (5) are (1) sufficient notice must be given to the opponent of the
evidence; (2) the statement must be offered as evidence of a material fact; (3) the statement must
be more probative on the point for which it was offered than any other evidence which the
proponent can reasonably procure and (4) the general purposes of these rules and the interests
of justice must best be served by admission of the statement into evidence." FED. R. EV1D. 803(24),
804 (b) (5) .
The purpose of the Federal Rules of Evidence are enunciated in Rule 102, which states, in
relevant part, "[Wiese rules shall be construed to secure fairness in administration, elimination
of unjustifiable expense and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of
evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined." FED.
R. Evil). 102.
262 See United States v. Calkins, 906 F.2d 1240, 1245 (8th Cir. 1990) (la) review of the
legislative history to this Rule reveals Congress' intention that the Rule be limited in scope and
narrow in focus."); DiSabatino, supra note 260, at 762.
"United States v. Love, 592 F.2d 1022, 1026 (8th Cir. 1979).
264 United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1368 (4th Cir. 1979).
266 1d.
266 Doe v. United States, 976 F.2d 1071, 1079 (7th Cir. 1992).
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In 1977, in Grimes v. Employers Mutual Liability Insurance Co., the
United States District Court for the District of Alaska held that the
admission of hearsay evidence in the form of a film showing assertive
conduct was admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24),
where the facts indicated that normal hearsay problems did not exist
or could be corrected.267 The lawsuit was for personal injuries arising
out of an industrial accident. 2" The plaintiff offered into evidence a
film demonstrating his daily routine including the performance of two
clinical tests. 269 The court found that the film was, by definition, hear-
say."' The court, however, admitted the film under Rule 803(24) to
communicate the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries."' The
court reasoned that the film would allow the jury to consider evidence
that was more probative than any other evidence that the plaintiff
could reasonably procure on the material issues of pain and suffering
and loss of enjoyments of life. 272 The court also believed that guaran-
tees of trustworthiness existed, as the plaintiff-actor and the verifying
witness were both subject to cross-examination. 27" Further, the court
noted that the plaintiff gave the defendant ample notice of his inten-
tion so that the defendant could adequately prepare his opposition. 274
The court concluded that use of the catchall exception was justified
here, as it is in all cases where ordinary hearsay problems do not exist
or can be adequately remedied."'
In sum, if computer-animated evidence is deemed to constitute
hearsay, it must fit into one of the hearsay exceptions in order to be
admissible into evidence."' The only exception that might plausibly
encompass computer-animated evidence is the catchall exception. 277
Thus, if computer-animated evidence constitutes hearsay, for it to be
admissible into evidence, its proponent must demonstrate that the
267 73 F.R.D. 607,611 (D.C. Alaska, 1977).
268
 Id. at 608.
am Id. at 608-09. One section of the film showed the plaintiff performing the jebsen-Taylor
Hand Function Test and a range-of-motion, prosthetic device test. Id. at 609.
270 Id. at 611.
271 Id. at 612.
272 Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
273 Id.
274 Id.
276 Id. More specifically, the court reasoned that, in this case, no problems with perception,
memory or meaning existed. Id. In addition, no sincerity problems existed because the verifying
witness and the plaintiff-actor were subject to cross-examination. Id.
276 See FED. R. Evil). 802.
277 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 801-05.
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evidence has "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" equivalent
to the enumerated exceptions and the threshold criteria are satisfied. 278
IV. ARGUMENTS UNDER CURRENT LAW AGAINST THE ADMISSIBILITY
OF COMPUTER-ANIMATED EVIDENCE AND A PROPOSAL TO
MITIGATE THE UNCERTAINTY SURROUNDING
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SUCH EVIDENCE
In jurisdictions that have adopted the Frye standard, computer-
animated evidence may be declared inadmissible on two separate
grounds.279
 First, computer-animated evidence is not generally ac-
cepted by the relevant community.'" Second, computer-animated evi-
dence constitutes inadmissible hearsay. 281
 In addition, in jurisdictions
that have adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence or an equivalent set
of evidentiary rules, computer-animated evidence may be declared
inadmissible on two grounds. First, as in Frye jurisdictions, computer-
animated evidence constitutes inadmissible hearsay.282 Second, com-
puter-animated evidence is inadmissible under the balancing test of
Federal Rule of Evidence 403. 2" Finally, the currently unaddressed
complexities inherent in the admission of computer-animated evi-
dence warrant an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence. 2" Even
those jurisdictions that continue to follow Frye should adopt such a
new rule.
A. Inadmissibility of Computer-Animated Evidence In. Frye Jurisdictions
Due To Lack of General Acceptance
In jurisdictions that have adopted the Frye standard, computer-ani-
mated evidence is inadmissible because it is not generally accepted
as accurate and reliable by the relevant community. 285
 As previously
278 See FED, R. Evto. 805(24), 804(b) (5). See supra note 261 for a discussion of the threshold
criterion for admissibility under the catchall exception.
279
 See infra notes 285-320 and accompanying text. It is important to note that the relevancy
and helpfulness requirements do not prevent computer-animated evidence from gaining admis-
sibility. This is because computer-animated evidence will provide the trier of fact with additional
information from which to make a judgment. Because the relevancy and helpfulness standards
are easily surmounted, the Frye standard fails to adequately protect the opponents of such
evidence.
28* See infra notes 285-87 and accompanying text.
281 See infra notes 288-93 and accompanying text.
282 Id.
283 See infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
2114 See infra notes 302-06 and accompanying text.
288 See Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32;
Strasser, supra note 19, at 1.
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stated, there is currently great debate among legal scholars and anima-
tors as to the reliability and accuracy of such evidence."" Specifically,
some commentators claim that the flawed production process may lead
to undetected inaccuracies in computer-animated evidence and that a
strong incentive exists for the creators of computer-animated evidence
to prepare such evidence in a biased manner. 287 Thus, computer-ani-
mated evidence is not generally accepted as accurate and reliable by
the relevant community. Therefore, in Frye jurisdictions, computer-ani-
mated evidence must be declared inadmissible.
B. Hearsay as an Argument Against the Admissibility of
Computer-Animated Evidence in Both Frye and Federal Rule Jurisdictions
In both Frye and Federal Rule jurisdictions, computer-animated
evidence, when used for substantive purposes, constitutes inadmissible
hearsay. 288 Specifically, animations constitute statements made out of
court that are being offered to prove "the truth of the matter as-
serted."'" As a result, computer-animated videotapes must be excluded
as hearsay evidence unless they can fit into one of the numerous
exceptions to the hearsay rule. 2`J°
The only exception to the hearsay rule that might plausibly en-
compass computer-animated videotapes is the residual or catchall ex-
ception."' Animations fail to fall within the catchall exception for two
reasons, First, because incentives exist for the creators of computer-ani-
mated evidence to prepare the videotapes in a biased manner and the
production process is flawed, computer-animated evidence lacks the
requisite "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness." 292
 Second, ad-
mission of animated evidence does not promote the "general purposes
of the [federal] rules" or the "interests of justice" because the admis-
sion into evidence of a computer-animated videotape will often unfairly
prejudice a criminal defendant, mislead the jury and present cumula-
288 See supra notes 150-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of commentators' criti-
cisms of computer-intimated evidence.
287 See Baird, supra note 19; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32; Kennedy, supra
note 41, at 1-2; Strasser, supra note 19, at 1.
288 See FED. R. Evio. 801(c). In the remainder of this Note, all discussions of hearsay refer
only to jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal Rules of'Evidence or an equivalent set of rules.
In addition, unless otherwise stated, such discussions do not include animations being used as
demonstrative evidence.
289 See FED. R. Evib. 801(c); Chaney, supra note 6, at 756.
290 See, e.g., FED. R. Evan. 801, 803-04.
291 Compare FED. R. Evtn. 803(24), 804(b)(5) with FED. R. Evil). 801, 803-4)4.
252 See FED. R. Evan. 803(24), 804(h) (5).
1114	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:1087
tive evidence. 298
 Thus, computer-animated evidence does not fall within
the purview of the catchall exception and, therefore, constitutes inad-
missible hearsay.
C. Inadmissibility of Computer-Animated Videotapes under
The Balancing Test of Federal Rule of Evidence 403
Consideration of the likelihood that the admission into evidence
of a computer-animated videotape will unfairly prejudice its oppo-
nents, mislead the jury and present cumulative evidence leads to the
inevitable conclusion that courts should deem such evidence inadmis-
sible. Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that
"[a] lthough relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evi-
dence."294 Whichever "path to admissibility"2" is pursued, the policies
enumerated in Rule 403 must be addressed. 298
Computer-animated evidence may unfairly prejudice its oppo-
nents by containing "subliminal messages" and by inviting verdicts
based upon emotion rather than objective fact 297 In addition, com-
puter-animated evidence may mislead juries because jurors may over-
estimate the value of such evidence, and inaccuracies in the animation
will often go undetected. 298 Finally, because animated evidence often
shows little more than the information to which an expert has already
testified, it may, in some circumstances, constitute cumulative evi-
dence. 299
"3 See id. See infra notes 294-301 and accompanying text.
"4 FED. R. Elfin. 403. Rule 403 only applies to jurisdictions that have adopted the Federal
Rules of Evidence or equivalent codes. The general policies surrounding Rule 403, however, are
applicable whether the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Frye standard is used. Seel McCoitancx
ON Evinr.Nce 779 (John William Strong ed., 1992).
295 See supra notes 187-248 and accompanying text for a discussion of (a) the common law
principles of demonstrative evidence, (b) the Frye standard of general acceptance and (c) the
admissibility standard under the Federal Rules of Evidence—the relevancy approach.
296 Seel MCGORmtcK, supra note 294, at 779.
292 Sherman, Impact, supra note 150, at 33; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Sherman, Moving
Graphics, supra note I, at 32; See Gibson v. Gunn, 202 N.Y.S. 19,20 (N.Y. App. Div. 1923) ("the
moving pictures present a fertile field for exaggeration of any emotion or action ... "), affd on
reh'g, 202 N.Y.S. 927 (1924).
299 Science and Technology Week, supra note 41; see also Krieger, Now Showing, supra note 7,
at 92; Kennedy, supra note 41, at 1-2; Sherman, Moving Graphics, supra note 1, at 32; Strasser,
supra note 19, at 1.
299 See Hadrian v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Transp. Co., 1 N.W.2d 755,758 (Wis. 1942) (admis-
sion of motion picture was error because, among other things, it proved fact previously estab-
lished by undisputed testimony of witness).
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In sum, computer-animated evidence may unfairly prejudice its
opponents, mislead jurors and present cumulative evidence. The pro-
bative value of computer-animated evidence will often be substantially
outweighed by these cbunterweights."° In such circumstances, Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 mandates that computer-animated evidence be
declared inadmissible."U 1
D. Proposed Amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence
The current rules of evidence fail to provide judges with sufficient
guidelines for the admissibility of computer-animated evidence
Moreover, the current rules fail to provide adequate safeguards against
the admission of potentially dangerous computer-animated evi-
dence." If adequate constraints are imposed, computer-animated evi-
dence will be used only in appropriate situations. The following pro-
posed amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence accomplishes
this: 504
Limited Admissibility of Computer-Animated Evidence
(a) Definition. "Computer-animated evidence" is a series
of still images created on a computer, which are
subsequently recorded one at a time onto a
videotape, laser disk or other similar medium to
produce a moving picture.
(b) Establishing an adequate foundation. In all cases,
both civil and criminal, establishing an adequate
foundation is a prerequisite to the admission of
computer-animated evidence. To be adequate, the
foundation must establish the reliability of:
(I) the original source data, as well as all
calculations used in analyzing the data,
(2) Its input into the computer,
(3) the operation of the computer and software,
(4) the output process used for the graphics,
(5) the medium used to reproduce the computer
graphics for presentation at trial and,
(6) the accuracy of the animation itself."5
3" See supra notes 294-99 and accompanying text.
"'See FED. R. Evm. 405.
502 Bulkeley, .supra note 3.
3° 3
 See supra notes 150-85 and accompanying text.
"Although proposed as an amendment to the Federal Rules of Evidence, it is hoped that
all states, including the remaining Frye jurisdictions, adopt a similar statute.
305 See Krieger, Admitted, supra note 6, at 96.
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(c) Civil Cases. In addition, in civil cases,
computer-animated evidence is admissible except
when:
(1) the probative value of such evidence is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading
the jury or
(2) the proponent of such evidence fails to provide
sufficient notice to the opposing counsel.
(d) Criminal Cases. In addition, in criminal cases,
computer-animated evidence may be used only if it meets
all of the following requirements:
(1) it is used to depict a linear movement capable of
measurement by generally accepted scientific
principles (i.e., mathematical formulas),
(2) it involves no recreation or portrayal of human
movement,
(3) the evidence is used to prove a material fact that
cannot adequately be proven in a less prejudicial
manner,
(4) the probative value of the evidence substantially
outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues and misleading the jury
and,
(5) the proponent of such evidence provides
opposing counsel with sufficient notice to allow
the opposition a fair opportunity to prepare for
cross-examination.
(e) Accordance With Other Rules. This rule in no way
restricts the application of any other Federal Rule of
Evidence to computer-animated evidence.
Part (b) of the proposed rule requires the establishment of an
adequate foundation as a prerequisite to the admission of computer-
animated evidence. Further, the rule enunciates the specific require-
ments necessary to establish such a foundation. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that only reliable and trustworthy animations
are admitted into evidence. By requiring the proponent of animated
evidence to establish the accuracy of the entire production process,
this requirement will expose previously undetected inaccuracies. This
is beneficial in two ways. First, judges will detect animations that con-
tain inaccuracies and will refuse to admit them into evidence. Second,
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this requirement will encourage care and honesty in the production
of animations. Specifically, litigants' strong interest in having their
animations admitted into evidence will cause them to do everything
within their power to ensure their accuracy. Similarly, producers of
animation, in order to maintain a good reputation, will make every
effort to produce an accurate product. Thus, part (b) of the proposed
rule will increase animation reliability as well as improve the rate of
detection of inaccuracies. Therefore, part (b) of the proposed rule will
lead to an increase in the accuracy of admissible animated evidence.
The proposed rule creates two distinct standards for admission—
one for civil trials and one for criminal prosecutions. Generally, in civil
trials, where only property interests are at stake, all relevant evidence
is admissible. Only in extreme situations will evidence be excluded as
unduly prejudicial in civil cases. In criminal prosecutions, however,
where life and liberty are at stake, a more stringent admissibility stand-
ard is necessary. In such situations, any evidence that may mislead the
jury or unfairly prejudice the litigant must be excluded from evidence.
Thus, with two distinct admissibility standards, the proposed rule is
able to provide criminal defendants with additional safeguards neces-
sary to protect their transcendent interests in the prosecution.
Part (c) enunciates the admissibility standard for computer-ani-
mated evidence in civil trials. The rule is one of inclusion. More
specifically, computer-animated evidence is admissible in civil trials
unless one of the two stated conditions occurs. Thus, if the probative
value of the animation is outweighed by the stated counterweights or
the proponent of the animation fails to provide sufficient notice to
opposing counsel, then the animation must be excluded. In all other
situations, however, the animation is admissible. Significantly, this pro-
vision maximizes the amount of relevant evidence to reach the trier of
fact. Simultaneously, it prevents the admission of highly prejudicial
evidence. Animations are excluded when their admission would un-
fairly prejudice a litigant or mislead the jury. Similarly, animations must
be excluded if their proponent fails to provide opposing counsel
sufficient notice to allow him or her a fair opportunity to prepare for
cross-examination.
Part (d) enunciates the admissibility standard for computer-ani-
mated evidence in criminal prosecutions. The rule is one of exclusion.
Computer-animated evidence is admissible in criminal prosecutions
only if all five of the enumerated requirements are satisfied. The
purpose of this provision is to ensure adequate protection of the rights
of the criminal defendant. More importantly, it is essential that all
potentially prejudicial, misleading and inaccurate materials be ex-
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eluded from evidence. If all five enunciated requirements are met,
justice requires admitting the animation into evidence.
The first requirement for admission of animations in the criminal
context provides that the animation depict only linear movements
capable of measurement by generally accepted scientific principles.
This requirement ensures the accuracy of all admitted animations. By
restricting the admissibility of animations to those that can be meas-
ured with precision, speculation in the creation of animations is re-
duced. Further, the animation can be created, and evaluated, with
simple mathematical formulae.
Similarly, the second requirement that animations must satisfy
prohibits the animation from depicting human movement. This re-
quirement attempts to ensure accuracy. Graphic recreation of human
motion inherently involves speculation because the precise movement
of the human body simply cannot be reenacted. As a result, animations
depicting human motion are made per se inadmissible.
The third requirement provides that the animation may only be
used to prove a material fact that cannot adequately be proven in a
less prejudicial manner. Given the tendency of animations to unduly
prejudice criminal defendants, mislead juries and contain inaccura-
cies, such evidence should only be admissible when it is absolutely
necessary. If the animation attempts to prove an immaterial fact or one
that could be proven in a less prejudicial fashion, the admissibility of
the animation is clearly not essential to the case. Thus, such an anima-
tion must be excluded from evidence.
The fourth requirement for admission of animation in the crimi-
nal context further protects the interests of the criminal defendant.
This subsection provides that, for animation to be admissible, its pro-
bative value must substantially outweigh the dangers of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues and misleading the jury. Importantly, the
rule uses the phrase "substantially outweighs" in describing this re-
quired weighing process. Thus, the requirement establishes a signi-
ficant burden on the proponent of the animation. This provision is
consistent with the general need to protect the interests of criminal
defendants.
The fifth requirement of the suggested provision states that the
proponent of the animation must provide opposing counsel with suf-
ficient notice that an animation will be offered. This rule will allow the
opposition a fair opportunity to prepare an effective cross-examina-
tion. Cross-examination is essential in order to enable the opposition
to expose inaccuracies in the animation. By ensuring sufficient time to
prepare for cross-examination, the provision increases the likelihood
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that inaccuracies in the animation will be detected during trial. This,
in turn, protects the interests of the criminal defendant.
In sum, the proposed rule imposes much needed safeguards upon
the admission of potentially dangerous computer-animated evidence.
The rule ensures that only those animations with sufficient indicia of
reliability are admitted into evidence. Further, the rule excludes all
potentially misleading or prejudicial animations from evidence. Finally,
the rule maximizes the opportunity for opponents of animations to
expose the inaccuracies in those animations being used against them.
Given the inability of current standards to adequately protect litigants
from potentially dangerous computer-animated evidence, all jurisdic-
tions should adopt the proposed rule.s06
V. CONCLUSION
In determining the admissibility of computer-animated evidence,
no hard and fast rule can be used. It is important that lawyers and
judges remain wary of several things. First, the admission into evidence
of a computer-animated videotape may be unfairly prejudicial, may
mislead the jury and may constitute cumulative evidence. Second, they
must bear in mind the likelihood of inaccuracies in animations and
the difficulties involved in detecting them. Third, they must remember
that animated evidence may constitute inadmissible hearsay. Fourth,
they must keep in mind the different standard for admissibility of such
evidence in civil and criminal cases.
The current rules of evidence fail to provide judges with sufficient
guidelines for the admissibility of computer-animated evidence. More-
over, the current rules fail to provide adequate safeguards against the
admission of potentially dangerous computer-animated evidence. As a
result, computer animations have become quite commonplace in civil
trials. In addition, the case by case analysis given to animations in the
criminal context has led to the admission of such evidence in several
recent prosecutions.
With the addition of the proposed amendment to the Federal
Rules of Evidence, both attorneys and judges will be in a position to
better assess the admissibility of computer-animated evidence. The rule
clearly establishes the foundational requirements necessary to ensure
that only reliable and trustworthy animations be admitted. Further, it
creates two distinct standards for admission—one for civil trials and
one for criminal prosecutions. By doing so, it is able to provide crimi-
306 See Bulkeley, supra note S.
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nal defendants with additional protection necessary to protect their
transcendent interests in the prosecution. Finally, the proposed rule
makes an important distinction between animations that recreate pre-
dictable, mechanical recreations of machine generated accidents and
those that attempt to replicate the movement of human beings.
Animated evidence has great potential for abuse, especially in the
criminal context. Animations are simply artfully planned and staged
presentations promoting one party's unproven theory. Such "evi-
dence," with its tremendous persuasiveness and retention value, must,
in most prosecutions, be excluded. Only reliable evidence should be
viewed by the trier of fact—the examination of staged presentations
must be left to the Oscars' Nominating Committee.
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